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HETEROGENEITY IN THE DEGREE OF QUASI-GEOMETRIC 
DISCOUNTING: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
 








  This paper modifies the standard one-sector growth model with 
uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and liquidity constraints to include multiple types of 
quasi-geometric consumers. For a calibrated version of the model, we show that a 
modest difference between the quasi-geometric discounting parameters of types 
can lead to large differences in their marginal propensities to consume. Unlike 
the standard one-sector growth model, the model with heterogeneous quasi-
geometric consumers can generate realistic degrees of wealth inequality. 
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Many recent studies deviate from the assumption of a constant discount fac-
tor emphasizing the importance of short-run urges to consume (to save) for
the individual consumption-savings decisions. Moreover, it is argued in the
literature that the real world consumers are heterogeneous in the degrees of
the short-run patience. Speciﬁcally, Krusell, Kuru¸ sçu and Smith (2002b) use
Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2001) framework to construct an asset-pricing model
with two types of agents diﬀering in short-run patience and show that such
heterogeneity can help to explain the U.S. asset-pricing data. Collado, Maliar
and Maliar (2003) use Spanish household data to estimate the Euler equa-
tion derived from Harris and Laibson’s (2001) model with quasi-geometric
discounting and ﬁnd that the degrees of short-run patience signiﬁcantly diﬀer
across consumers.1
In this paper, we investigate how heterogeneity in the degree of short-
run patience can aﬀect the distributions of income and wealth across agents.
1The concept of quasi-geometric (hyperbolic) discounting was developed by Strotz
(1955-1956), Pollak (1968), and Phelps and Pollak (1968). The recent literature on quasi-
geometric discounting includes, e.g., Laibson (1997), Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman
(1998), Hall (1998), Barro (1999), Harris and Laibson (2001), Krusell and Smith (2000,
2003), Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman and Weinberg (2001), Krusell, Kuru¸ sçu
and Smith (2002a), Collado, Maliar and Maliar (2003), Maliar and Maliar (2003a, 2003b).
3Our analysis is carried out in the context of a general equilibrium variant of
Harris and Laibson’s (2001) model augmented to include multiple types of
quasi-geometric consumers. The types diﬀer in the dimension of the short-
run discount factor (one used between today and tomorrow). The long-run
discount factor (one used between any two adjacent periods other than today
and tomorrow) is identical for all consumers.2 W er e f e rt oac o n s u m e rw h o s e
short-run discount factor is lower (higher) than the long-run discount factor
as a short-run impatient (short-run patient) one.3
Our study is motivated by the fact that the standard one-sector growth
model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and liquidity constraints fails to
explain the inequality of the income and wealth distributions existing in
actual economies. To be precise, such a model severely overpredicts income
a n dw e a l t hh e l db yt h ep o o ra n du n d e r p r e d i c t si n c o m ea n dw e a l t hh e l db y
the rich (see Aiyagari, 1994, and Quadrini and Ríos-Rull, 1997). As argued
in Krusell and Smith (1998) and Carroll (2000), the underling problem is
that the model produces too small variations in the Marginal Propensities to
Consume (MPCs) across agents. These studies propose one way to magnify
2Thus, a consumer discounts all future utilities, except of tomorrow’s utility, according
to geometrically declining sequence of weights. Krusell and Smith (2000) were ﬁrst to call
such discounting quasi-geometric.
3The assumption of short-run impatient consumers is advocated by Laibson (1997).
Hall (1998) argues that short-run patience is also empirically plausible.
4diﬀerences in the MPCs across agents, which is to assume heterogeneity in
the (long-run) discount factors.
In this paper, we show that the introduction of heterogeneity in the de-
gree of short-run patience is another way of generating large diﬀerences in
the MPCs across agents. The mechanism here is as follows: Quasi-geometric
discounting leads to time-inconsistency in preferences. When making plans
about consumption in a distant future, consumers discount the utilities in
any two adjacent periods by using the long-run discount factor. However, as
time to fulﬁll the consumption plan arrives, the preferences change: now, the
tomorrow’s utility is discounted by using the short-run discount factor. The
preference reversal makes the agents to deviate from the original consump-
tion plans: the short-run impatient agents consume more and the short-run
patient agents consume less than they would have committed to in the pre-
vious period if commitment had been available. The consequence is that the
MPCs of short-run patient consumers tends to be lower than the MPCs of
short-run impatient ones.
We analyze the quantitative implications of the calibrated two-type ver-
sion of the model. We ﬁnd that a relatively small diﬀerence between the
degrees of quasi-geometric discounting of the types can lead to large diﬀer-
5ences in their consumption-savings decisions. For example, under the base-
line parametrization, the MPC of a short-run patient consumer is on average
almost 10 times lower than the MPC of a short-run impatient one. Given
this foregoing result, it is no surprise that our model predicts a sharp polar-
ization of the population: short-run impatient agents get very poor, whereas
short-run patient agents get very rich. We ﬁnd that if the population is com-
posed of few short-run patient and many short-run impatient agents, then
the degrees of wealth inequality in our model are comparable to those in the
data. Also, our model generates more inequality in income than the standard
one-sector growth model does, however, the improvement is not suﬃcient to
account for the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the
model. Section 3 describes the calibration and solution procedures and dis-
cusses the results, and ﬁnally, Section 4 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We extend Aiyagari’s (1994) model to include ex-ante heterogeneous quasi-
geometric consumers. Time is taken in discrete intervals, t =0 ,1,2,....T h e
economy is populated by H ≥ 1 types of inﬁnitely-lived agents indexed by
h =1 ,2,...,H.W i t h i nat y p eh, there is a continuum of agents with names on
6a closed interval [0,λh],w h e r e
SH
h=1 λh =1 .T h ep a r a m e t e rλh > 0 reﬂects
the relative size of type h. Heterogeneity across types is in the dimension
of the discounting parameter βh.I n p e r i o d t, an agent puts the weight 1
on the utility of period t and the weight βhδ
τ+1−t on the utility of period
τ >t , where the discounting parameters βh and δ are such that βh > 0 and
0 < δ < 1. Agents are subject to idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks.
T h ep r o c e s sf o rs h o c k si saﬁrst-order Markov one; it is identical for all agents
and uncorrelated across agents.














ch,τ + ah,τ+1 = wsh,τ +( 1+r)ah,τ, (2)
ah,τ+1 ≥− b, (3)
ah,τ ∈ A and sh,τ ∈ S are given, where A =[ −b,∞) ⊂ R and S =
[smin,s max] ⊂ R+.H e r e , Et denotes the expectation, conditional on all in-
formation available at t; ch,τ, ah,τ and sh,τ are consumption, asset holdings
and idiosyncratic shock to labor productivity, respectively; r is the interest
7rate and w i st h ew a g ep e ru n i to fe ﬃciency labor; b is the borrowing limit.
The momentary utility function u(c) is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes lim
c→0u  (c)=∞.
The assumption of βh  =1generates time-inconsistent choices. If βh < 1,
the short-run discount factor (the one between the periods t and t+1), βhδ,
is smaller than the long-run discount factor (the one between any two adja-
cent periods further in the future), δ. As a result, an agent systematically
undersaves relative to what she would have committed to in the past if com-
mitment had been available. If βh > 1, then the opposite is true: an agent
saves more than she would have committed to in the past. If βh =1 ,t h e n
the preferences are time-consistent: a choice perceived to be optimal in the
past remains to be optimal in all subsequent periods.




t ,w i t hα ∈ [0,1],w h e r eKt and Nt are the aggregate capital and
labor inputs, respectively. The depreciation rate of capital is d ∈ (0,1].
Therefore, the production technology is given by Kα
t N
1−α
t +( 1− d)Kt.
2.1 Equilibrium
Harris and Laibson (2001) show that the problem (1)−(3) without commit-
ment can be represented recursively. In our economy, an agent of type h with
8current state (ah,s h) solves:






h) | sh]}, (4)
where given ah, sh, the value function Vh (ah,s h) solves the functional equa-
tion




subject to the budget constraint
a
 
h = wsh +( 1+r)ah − ch, (6)
and the borrowing constraint
a
 
h ≥− b. (7)
Here, primes on variables indicate their values one period from now.
We restrict attention to an interior solution. If such a solution exists, the
optimal choice of an agent of type h must satisfy the quasi-geometric Euler
equation
u















where Ch (a 
h,s  
h) is the optimal consumption function. If the borrowing
constraint is not binding, i.e., a 
h > −b,t h e n(8) holds with equality.
9Let Ph (ah,s h,B) be the conditional probability that an agent of type h
with state (ah,s h) will have a state lying in set B ∈ B in the next period
Ph (ah,s h,B)=Prob({s
 
h ∈ S :[ Ah (ah,s h),s h] ∈ B}|sh),
where B denotes the Borel subset of the set of all possible individual states
A×S,a n dAh (ah,s h) ≡ a 
h = wsh +( 1+r)ah − Ch (ah,s h) is the decision
function for assets (the asset function).
Deﬁnition. An equilibrium is deﬁned as a set of stationary probability
measures {xh}h∈H, a set of optimal consumption functions {Ch (ah,s h)}h∈H
and four positive real numbers (K,N,r,w) such that
(1) xh =
U
A×S Ph(ah,s h,B)dxh for all B ∈ B and h ∈ H;





A×S Ah (ah,s h)dxh and N =1 ;4
(4) r and w are equal to the corresponding marginal products
r = αK
α−1 − d, w =( 1− α)K
α.
Thus, in the economy studied, the aggregate quantities and prices are
constant even though the individual quantities vary stochastically.
4Given that there is a continuum of agents of each type h, the mass of agents with shocks
sh,t = s and sh,t+1 = s  is equal to the conditional probability Prob(sh,t+1 = s  | sh,t = s).
The process for labor productivity shocks is stationary and, therefore, such probability is




A×S sh,tdxh is constant; for convenience,
we normalize it to unity, Nt =1for all t.
103 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we study the implications of the model by simulation. First,
we describe the calibration procedure, secondly, we discuss some computa-
tional issues and ﬁnally, we present the results.
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model following Aiyagari (1994). The model’s period is one
year. We assume δ =0 .96, α =0 .36 and d =0 .08. We set the borrowing
limit at b =0 . The momentary utility function is u(c)=l o g( c).T h ep r o c e s s
for idiosyncratic shocks is AR(1),
logsh,t+1 = ρlogsh,t + σ

1 − ρ
21/2 εh,t+1, εh,t+1 ∼ N (0,1),
where ρ ∈ [0,1] is the autocorrelation coeﬃcient, and σ ≥ 0 is the uncondi-
tional standard deviation of the variable logsh,t. Our baseline parameteriza-
tion is ρ =0 .6 and σ =0 .2. We also study the case ρ =0 .9 and σ =0 .4.
Regarding the discounting parameter βh, we consider several alterna-
tives. The Benchmark Model (BM) is the one studied in Aiyagari (1994):
all consumers have identical time-consistent preferences, H =1and β1 =1 .
We then consider two homogeneous agents economies with time inconsis-
11tent preferences: one, populated by short-run patient consumers, H =1
and β1 =1 .2, and another, populated by short-run impatient consumers,
H =1and β1 =0 .8.W e ﬁnally analyze the economies populated by two
types of consumers, H =2 , such that β1 =0 .8 and β2 =1 .2.5 The shares
of the ﬁrst and second types are λ and 1 − λ, respectively; we consider
λ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.
3.2 Solution algorithm
Krusell and Smith (2000) study the standard inﬁnite-horizon determinis-
tic neoclassical growth model with quasi-geometric discounting and ﬁnd that
value iterative methods produce cycles. Krusell and Smith (2000, 2003) show
that the computational problems are related to the indeterminacy of equilib-
rium: in addition to a smooth interior solution, the model has a continuum
of step-function equilibria. Krusell et al. (2002a) argue that one can work
around the indeterminacy by restricting attention to the interior solution,
which is a unique limit of the ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium. Nonetheless, the
indeterminacy in the inﬁnite-horizon model tends to make the computation
of equilibria diﬃcult since many algorithms are ”attracted” to other equi-
5Laibson et al. (1998) argue that empirically plausible value of βh for the short-run
impatient consumers will be around 0.6. Given this estimate, the assumed diﬀerence in
short-run patience between the two types seems to be modest.
12libria besides the limit of the ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium. To deal with this
problem, Krusell et al. (2002a) develop a perturbation method, which can
systematically pick out the limit of the ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium.
In this paper, we solve the model by a parameterized expectations al-
gorithm implemented on a grid of prespeciﬁed points. (The description of
the algorithm is provided in Maliar and Maliar, 2003b). Maliar and Maliar
(2003a) study the convergence properties of this algorithm in the context
of the one-agent neoclassical growth model with quasi-geometric discounting
and show that it yields the same solutions as those obtained by the pertur-
bation method proposed by Krusell et al. (2002a). The drawback of our
algorithm is that it works not for all parameters’ values: it converges only if
βh is not very diﬀerent from one (speciﬁcally, βh ∈ [0.8,1.2])a n di ft h eg r i d
is not too ﬁne.
3.3 Results
Before presenting the results, we shall discuss how the degree of the agent’s
short-run patience aﬀects her consumption-savings decisions. As can be seen
from the Euler equation (8), the future rate of return on assets, Rh(a 
h,s  
h),












In all our simulations, the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) out of





h > 0 for all a 
h,s  
h.T h u s , i f βh > 1
(βh < 1), the individual subjective rate of return on assets, Rh(a 
h,s  
h),i s
higher (lower) than the actual one, r, which induces the agent to save more
(less) relative to the case βh =1 . Moreover, if the consumption function is
strictly concave, which was the case in our simulations, then Rh(a 
h,s  
h) is
strictly decreasing (increasing) in the level of wealth under βh > 1( βh < 1).
This implies that if βh > 1( βh < 1), the rich have a lower (higher) savings
rate than the poor.6
To appreciate the quantitative expression of the eﬀects associated with
quasi-geometric discounting, in Table1,w ep r o v i d et h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient of the
wealth distribution and the percentages of wealth held by diﬀerent groups of
the population in the artiﬁcial and the U. S. economies.
We ﬁrst consider the economy populated by one type of agents, H =1 ,
under β1 =0 .8( λ =1 ) , β1 =1 .0 (BM) and β1 =1 .2( λ =0 ) .T h e m a i n
thing to notice here is that with one type of agents, the wealth is much



































                  
ρ  =0.6  BM .0523 
(.0192) 
- 3.98  0.33 17.0 38.6  9.5  9.5  3.1 
σ =0.2  λ =0  .0493 
(.0080) 
- 3.09  0.23 22.8 31.2  8.1  7.5  2.3 
  λ =1  .0576 
(.0368) 
- 5.05  0.39 12.0 42.2 10.4 10.4  3.5 




3.20 0.42  8.9  39.6  10.1  9.4  2.9 




3.31 0.60  0.2  53.3  13.7  13.1  4.1 




3.42 0.78  0  86.5  22.7  22.4  7.1 
                  
ρ  =0.9  BM .0716 
(.0344) 
- 3.33  0.45 10.4 46.6 11.7 12.0  4.1 
σ =0.4  λ =0  .0621 
(.0223) 
- 2.38  0.41 13.3 43.2 11.0 11.0  3.6 
  λ =1  .0820 
(.0576) 
- 4.40  0.47 9.7  48.6 12.0 12.6  4.4 




2.59 0.51  6.4  50.1  12.7  12.8  4.3 




2.85 0.62  1.5  60.7  15.4  15.8  5.4 




3.01 0.73  0.8  77.8  21.0  23.5  8.3 
         
U.S. 
(a)
  0.76 2.2  77.1 12.6 23.1 28.2 
 
(a)Source: Quadrini and Ríos-Rule (1997) more equally distributed in the model than in the data. A lower degree of
quasi-geometric discounting, β1, leads to a larger dispersion of wealth across
agents. This eﬀect is modest, however.7
We now turn to the economy with two types of agents, H =2 .I nFigure
1, we plot the stationary probability distributions of shocks and assets for
the economies with λ =0 .25, λ =0 .5 and λ =0 .75 (we again assume
ρ =0 .6 and σ =0 .2). As we can see, the probability distribution is two-
peaked. Agents who are short-run patient (β2 =1 .2) are distributed around
the high-mean peak whereas those who are short-run impatient (β1 =0 .8)
are concentrated tightly around zero. Thus, most of the short-run impatient
agents are liquidity-constrained.
The results in Table1 demonstrate that the introduction of two types of
agents can substantially increase the wealth inequality in the model. The
noteworthy case is one where the economy is composed of many short-run
impatient and few short-run patient agents (λ =0 .75). Compare, for exam-
ple, this economy with the one populated by short-run impatient agents only
(λ =1 )under ρ =0 .6 and σ =0 .2. After incorporating 25% of the short-run
patient population, the percentages of wealth held by the richest 99 − 100%
7The quantitative implications of the economy with one type of quasi-geometric con-
sumers are extensively studied in Maliar and Maliar (2003).
16and 95 − 99% of the population increase from 3.5 to 7.1 and from 10.4 to
22.4, respectively; the percentage of wealth held by the bottom 40% reduces
from 12 to 0;t h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient rises from 0.39 to 0.78. As we see, all the
statistics get closer to their empirical counterparts except of the percentage
of wealth held by 90−95% of the population, which is now too high relative
to the data.8
As i g n i ﬁcant increase in wealth inequality occurs because the assumed
two types of agents have very diﬀerent consumption-savings behavior. To
illustrate this fact, in Table1, we provide the mean and the standard devia-
tion (in brackets) of the MPC out of assets. In the economies with two types,
the average MPC of the short-run impatient consumers (MPC1) is almost
10 times higher than that of the short-run patient consumers (MPC2).T h e
consequence is that consumers of the ﬁr s tt y p ea r ep o o r ,w h e r e a st h o s eo f
the second type are rich.9
Why do we observe a non-monotonic relation between λ and the degrees
of wealth inequality? The explanation for this result lies in the relation be-
8This drawback is related to the fact that the wealth distribution has two peaks. In-
cluding more than two types in the model will help to generate a more realistic shape of
the wealth distribution.
9Hence, the mechanism that produces a large dispersion of wealth in our model is
similar to one advocated by Krusell and Smith (1998) and Carroll (2000). In particular,
Carroll (2000) argues: ”the crucial requirement for many purposes is likely to be simply
that the model have multiple classes of households, some with little wealth and a high
MPC and some with substantial wealth and a low MPC...”.
18tween an individual’s eﬀective discount rate and the equilibrium interest rate.
In a two-type economy, 0 < λ < 1, the interest rate is determined mostly by
the discount rate of the short-run patient agents. The gap between the equi-
librium interest rate and the eﬀective discount rate of the short-run impatient
agents is therefore large enough that such agents choose not to accumulate
much wealth. Consequently, the MPCs of the short-run impatient agents are
much larger than those of the short-run patient agents. If, instead, all agents
become short-run impatient, λ =1 , or all agents become short-run patient,
λ =0 , then the gap between the individual eﬀective discount rates and the
interest rate becomes small as the interest rate adjusts in equilibrium to clear
asset markets.10
We next focus on income inequality. Table2 summarizes the statistics on
the income distribution in the artiﬁcial and the U. S. economies. The tenden-
cies here are parallel to those established for the distribution of wealth. In a
one-type economy, variations in the degree of the agents’ short-run patience
do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the size of income inequality. The introduction of
two types makes the income distribution more unequal as a higher wealth
inequality leads to a higher dispersion of capital income. The increase in
10A similar phenomenon occurs in the model by Krusell and Smith (1998) where agents




























          
ρ  =0.6  BM 0.12  32.2  26.2  6.5  5.8  1.7 
σ =0.2  λ =0  0.12 31.8 26.5  6.6  5.9  1.7 
  λ =1  0.13 31.2 26.9  6.7  6.0  1.8 
  λ =.25  0.13 31.5 26.7  6.6  5.8  1.7 
  λ =.50  0.14 30.2 27.5  7.0  6.1  1.8 
  λ =.75  0.18 25.2 30.7  7.8  7.1  2.1 
          
ρ  =0.9  BM 0.23  24.9  33.3  8.3  8.1  2.3 
σ =0.4  λ =0  0.23 25.1 33.2  8.3  8.0  2.3 
  λ =1  0.23 24.8 33.2  8.4  8.0  2.3 
  λ =.25  0.23 25.1 33.1  8.4  8.1  2.3 
  λ =.50  0.23 24.6 33.5  8.5  8.1  2.4 
  λ =.75  0.27 22.9 35.6  9.2  8.7  2.9 
         
U.S. 
(a)
  0.51 10.3 53.6 10.7 13.5 14.1 
 
(a)Source: Quadrini and Ríos-Rule (1997). income inequality is modest, however.
We ﬁnally assess the robustness of our results to variations in the pa-
rameters ρ and σ. The tendencies described above proved to be robust to
all modiﬁcations considered. As an example, in Tables 1 and 2,w er e p o r t
the model’s predictions under ρ =0 .9 and σ =0 .4. As we see, the diﬀer-
ence between the MPCs of the short-run impatient and short-run patient
agents is now lower than that in the baseline case ρ =0 .6 and σ =0 .2.T h e
MPCs of the short-run impatient agents reduce because higher idiosyncratic
uncertainty increases their precautionary savings. A precautionary motive
for savings is practically missing for the short-run patient agents who are
rich enough not to face the liquidity constraint. The MPCs of such agents
increase because the interest rate goes down in response to higher precaution-
ary savings of the short-run impatient population. Although the diﬀerences
between the MPCs of types get smaller relative to the baseline case, the
resulting degrees of wealth inequality are of roughly the same magnitude.
Regarding the income distribution, we observe that higher labor income un-
certainty leads to a higher dispersion of income across agents. As in the
baseline case, introducing two types of agents makes the income distribution
even more unequal. Still, the model’s predictions on income inequality are
21far from the data.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigates the quantitative implications of a general equilibrium
model with two types of quasi-geometric consumers. We ﬁnd that a modest
diﬀerence between the types’ short-run discount factors can lead to very
diﬀering consumption-savings behavior: in the baseline case, the average
MPCs of the types diﬀer by almost the factor of 10! W es h o wt h a tt h e
constructed model is capable of generating the degrees of wealth inequality
which are much larger than those predicted by the standard one-sector growth
model and which are comparable to those observed in the data.
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